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J CHRISTIAN HOMES ~ 
~ ABILENE, INC.
Cert to Tex.Civ.App. (Brown) 
State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the refusal of the Texas 
courts to legitimate his child. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Under Texas law, the 
relationship between a parent and a legitimate or legitimated 
lfrll frt t£-(r f 1- 17 )6 n ~. j:. ~ M 7+ ft, 
~ f,. & 1unl, v' ~i.. Jl ~ -d.N ~ ~. 
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child cannot be terminated without a showing of parental unfit-
ness. Tex. Fam. Code §15.02. An unwed father can petition a -
court to legitimate his child, and, if he establishes paternity 
and obtains the consent of the mother or the managing conserva-
tor, the court will legitimate the child. If the mother or con-
servator denies consent, the court can legitimate the child if it 
is in the best interests of the child. 
Resp, Christian Homes, sought to terminate the parent-child 
relationship between Baby Girl S and her natural mother. The 
natural father filed a cross-action seeking to legitimate the 
child and gain custody. The TC terminated the parent-child rela-
tionship between the child and her mother and denied the father's 
petition to legitimate, permitting the resp to place the child 
for adoption. Tex.Civ.App. affirmed, and the Tex.S.Ct. denied 
review. 
At the time of the hearing, the mother was 16 and the father 
25. They had had a relationship for at least a year and a half 
before the child was conceived but had not lived together. The 
child was born in a home for unwed mothers run by resp. The 
mother's parents disapproved of the father and refused to allow a 
marriage. The mother, herself an adopted child "aware of the 
stigma under which an illegitimate child suffers," and wanting 
her child "reared in a two-parent Christ ian home," decided to 
relinquish her rights and give the child up for adoption. The 
father wanted custody of the child, although resp asserts that he 
was not consistent in that desire. He planned to raise her in 
the town in which his relationship with the mother had taken 
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place and planned to enlist the assistance of his mother and sis-
ter. When he learned that the mother was pregnant, he asked to 
marry her. He also offered to pay the expenses of the child's 
birth, and he deposited money in court for the child's support, 
but he had never had a family relationship with the child. He 
suffered from epilepsy that was controlled by medication. 
The Tex.Civ.App. held that the gender-based distinction in 
the statute was justified because it was substantially related to 
the goal of protecting the best interests of illegitimate chil-
dren. The court also held that the TC had properly applied Texas 
law and that the statute did not violate the state Equal Rights 
Amendment. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this Court has 
never established the substantive standard that the state must 
meet before it terminates a parent-child relationship. Texas 
permits involuntary termination of that relationship on the 
judge's subjective conclusion that the continuation of the rela-
tionship is not in the best interests of the child, rather than 
requiring a showing that the parent is unfit. 
Petr also contends that the best interests standard is un-
constitutionally vague. When the state seeks to intrude on a 
protected relationship like this one, where the parent has gone 
to great lengths to assume his parental responsibilities, it must 
define the substantive standard precisely. This standard does not 
give the putative father sufficient notice of what he must do to 
persuade the court that he should be allowed to keep his child. 
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Further, the standard invites discriminatory and arbitrary 
application of the law. Finally, the vagueness of the standard 
is analogous to excessive delegation by the legislature, trans-
ferring the power to enunciate policy governing termination of 
the parent-child relationship from the legislature to the judi-
ciary. 
/ Next, petr contends that the decision below conflicts wiht 
~aban v. Mohammed, 441 us 380 (1979), where the Court invalidated 
a NY statute permitting the unwed mother to veto the adoption of 
the child but denying the father similar rights. The Texas 
courts have upheld the law, see In re T.E.T., 602 SW2d 793, cert. 
denied, 450 US 1025 (1981) (Brennan, Marshall, White, JJ., dis-
senting) on the theory that unwed fathers can legitimate their 
children and then they too have the right to block adoption. But 
the mother can block legitimation proceedings by the father un-
less he can establish that legitimation will serve the best in-
terests of the child, so, according to petr, there is still gen-
der discrimination. Also, the statute makes an irrational dis-
tinction between fathers who are the subject of involuntary le-
gitimation proceedings, for they can block adoption absent a 
showing that they are unfit. 
Further, petr asserts that the statute discriminates against 
illegitimate children by denying them the opportunity to enjoy 
relationships with their biological fathers. 
Finally, petr contends that the statute is inconsistent with 
Santosky v. Kramer, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), because it places the 
burden on the illegitimate father to prove that it would advance 
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the best interests of the child to grant his petition for legiti-
mation. 
Resp contends that any distinctions created by the statutory 
scheme are related to the state's interest in protecting the wel-
fare of the child. Requiring the putative father to establish 
his relationship by showing that legitimation would be in the 
best interests of the child is reasonable because 11 [o] therwise, 
we would recognize a sperm donor, a rapist, a hit and run lover, 
an adulterer and the like in the same legal status as a father 
who had accepted the legal and moral commitment to his family. 11 
Further, the state should not have to take on the burden of show-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that the unwed father was 
unfit in every case -- often, the father has done nothing to show 
any concern for his child. 
Resp also argues that petr lacks standing to challenge any 
discrimination against illegitimate children and that he failed 
to raise his constitutional challenges to the vagueness of the 
standard, the burden of proof, or to the substantive standard 
(best interests or parental unfitness) below. 
Finally, resp asserts that Santosky is inapplicable because 
it mandates that the burden be on the state to prove neglect by 
clear and convincing evidence only when there is a family rela-
tionship to be terminated. 
4. DISCUSSION: The opinion below merely states that 
the petr challenged the statute under the due process clause and 




the petr raised the specific aspects of the scheme that he raises 
now. A call for the record should clarify that point. 
Petr does not have standing to challenge discrimination 
against illegitimate children. 
Assuming that it was raised below, I think that petr has 
raised an important question concerning the limitations, if any, 
on the substantive standard for denial of parental rights. 
Santosky suggested that some showing of unfitness is required 
before the state can break up a family. See slip op. at 13 n.lO, 
citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 u.s. 246, 255 (1978}: cf. Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 US 38 0, 39 4 n .16 (1979} (reserving question} • 
Presumably that showing is not necessary to terminate the rights 
of an unwed father who has never shown any interest in his chil-
dren, see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 US, at 392 & n.l3: Quilloin, 
supra. But, to my knowledge, the Court has not decided a case 
dealing with the right of the father to legitimate his child when 
there is no pre-existing family relationship because of the re-
cent birth of the child. 
The burden of proof issue, again assuming that it was raised 
below, also seems to me to be important. Quilloin approved the 
best interest standard in the case of a father who had never at-
tempted to take responsibility for his child, presumably on the 
theory that he had had an opportunity to do so. When the father 
attempts to take responsibility for his newborn child, he may be 
entitled to the same protections that Santosky gives a father who 
has taken responsibility for an older child -- the placement of 
the burden of proof on the state. Lehr v. Roberston, No. 81-1756 
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(to be argued Dec. 7) raises a similar issue: what steps must a 
putative father take to become entitled to the procedural protec-
tions of notice and an opportunity to be heard in adoption 
proceedings? 
I recommend calling for the record to determine whether 
these issues were raised below and, if the burden of proof ques-
tion was raised, holding for Lehr. 
There is a response. 
December 3, 1982 Smalley opn in petn 
) ' 
.. ; 
January 7, 1983 
CO'Urt ••.••••••••••••••••• l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
DONALD J. KIRKPATRICK v. CHRISTIAN HOMES OF 
ABILENE, INC., ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF AP-
PEALS OF TEXAS, ELEVENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
No. 82-647. Decided January-, 1983 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
This case concerns the constitutionality of a ~tatu­
tory scheme which, in effect, allows the State to sever the 
parent-child relationship between a concerned and competent 
father and his out-of-wedlock infant daughter solely because 
the father has failed to persuade a judge that continuation of 
the relationship would be in the child's "best interest." The 
petitioning father raises important Equal Protection and Due 
Process challenges to these laws that this Court should 
consider. 
This controversy began when the mother placed the daugh-
ter, at birth, with respondent, a licensed child placement 
service. When respondent moved in court to confirm the 
mother's relinquishment for adoption, petitioner cross-moved 
for an order of voluntary legitimation, in order to obtain cus-
tody of the child for himself. 
In essence, under Texas law, the rights of a "parent" can 
be involuntarily terminated only if the state can prove unfit-
ness. 1 An unwed mother is always deemed a "parent" of the 
child, but ~n unwed father is not. 2 The father is recognized 
as a "parent'' only if the mother consents, or if he proves, in a 
legitimation proceeding, that it would be in the best interest 
of the child to award him such status. 3 In the present case, 
since the mother did not give her consent, and since, in the 
1 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15.02 (Supp. 1982). 
2 !d. § 11.01(3). 








2 KIRKPATRICK v. CHRISTIAN HOMES 
opinion of the courts below, it would not serve the child's best 
interest to be raised by petitioner, respondent was appointed 
managing conservator of the child for the purpose of placing 
her for adoption. 
This Court has recognized the "fundamental liberty inter-
est of natural parents in the care, custody, and management 
of their child[ren]." Santosky v. Kramer,-- U. S. --, 
- (1982). SeevStanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 545 (1972). 
On two previous occasions, the Court has indicated in dicta 
that there is "little doubt" that a State cannot, without of-
fending the Due Process Clause, terminate a natural parent's 
rights without a showing of parental unfitness. Santosky, 
-- U. S., at -- n. 10; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 
255 (1978). In both Santosky and Quilloin, the Court indi-
cated agreement with Justice Stewart's statement in his con-
curring opinion in Smi~ter Families, 
431 U. S. 816, 862-863 (1977), that "[i]f a State were to at-
tempt to force the breakup of a natural family . . . without 
some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do 
so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should 
have little doubt that the State would have intruded imper-
missibly on the 'private realm of family life which the state 
cannot enter.' Pri~ v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 
166." However, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 
414-415 (1979), four Members of the Court suggested that 
the term "family'' should only refer to a two-parent family. 
Id., at 414-415, 414 n. 27 (dissenting opinion). The Caban 
majority expressly reserved the question. Id., at 394 n. 16. 
In the present case, the Texas courts have broken up the 
natural father-daughter "family" without any proof that the 
petitio~nfit to be a parent. ~d­
ings were made on the point, t he evidence appears to suggest 
that petitioner is perfectly fit to raise his daughter. 4 There-
~/"" 
' The mother testified that petitioner is "a wonderful man . . . a good 
man, a hard worker." Tr. 63. She indicated that she was withholding her 
consent to the child's legitimation by the father largely because she wanted 
the child adopted by "two Christian parents." Tr. 54-55. 
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fore, certiorari should be granted so that we may definitively 
affirm, disavow, or otherwise clarify the dicta in Santosky 
and Quilloin and finally decide the unsettled question posed 
by this case. 5 
In addition to the serious Due Process issue raised by this 
case, there is a weighty Equal Protection claim. There is an 
obvious gender-based distinction in these Texas laws: the 
mother-cliild relationsllip can '1>e termmated only for unfit-
ness, while the father can lose all parental rights under a 
"best interest" standard. In order to survive scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Texas scheme must be 
closely and substantially related to the achievement of an im-
portant governmental objective. Caban v. Mohammed, 
supra, 441 U. S., at 388; Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 
(1976). Petitioner contends that the challenged laws are 
based simply on the sexual stereotype that women can be 
more trusted with children than men, and his argument is not 
without force. At the least, there is sufficient doubt to merit 
this Court's attention. 
The importance of these issues to many unwed fathers and 
their children can hardly be~from the 
Court's refusaTio consider them. 
5 Respondent incorrectly asserts that we held a "best interest" standard 
to be constitutionally permissible in a situation. such as this in Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978). The Quilloin Court was careful to note that 
it was not deciding "a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or 
sought, actual or legal custody of his child." Id., at 255 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, petitioner seeks legal custody. 
January 14, 1983 
Court ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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N POST DI S AFF REV AFF· G D 
82-647 
No. 
ABSEN T NOT VOTING 
lfp/ss 03/02/82 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mark DATE: March 2, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-2057 Daggett ' 
In view of my conviction that Kirkpatrick's "slide 
rule precision" requirement is little short of ridiculous, I 
may write if this case comes out the way I expect it will. 
It would be interesting to have some comparisons 
between the 1970 and 1980 census that might illustrate the 
extent to which population shifts occur fairly rapidly, re-
sulting in the mathematical exactitude of any given date 
being unrealistic often within a matter of a few years. 
As I am not familiar with the extent to which the 
census figures are broken down in a way that may be helpful, 
perhaps you could brief someone in the library (Sara Sonet, 
for example) to look into this. The comparisons are avail-
able, of course, as to the loss and gain in congressional 
districts, and this may be significant. In those cases dis-
trict lines have to be redrawn. It would be interesting, if 
the information is available, as to how frequently lines 
within a state have been redrawn without any increase or 




.§n;rr~utt <!Jmtrf cf tq~ ~nit~b .§talt.s-
~:urqhtgton, ~. <!f. 21l.?Jl.~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY c'CONNOR 
March 7, 1983 
No. 82-647 Kirkpatrick v. Christian Horne 
of Abilene 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackrnun 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
~u:puuu Q}llUrlllf llft ~ttlt ~.hrlt.s­
~aglfhtghm. ~. <!}. 20,5)!.,;1 
CHAMBERS OF 
-JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 7, 1983 
Re: No. 82-647 - Kirkpatrick v. Christian 
Homes of Abilene 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
' I t : t · ~ 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
No. 82-647, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
To: The Cllh1f Jm:;tica 
Justi..ce I'J'c:nnJ.n 
Justi •:<• .n ·, Le 
Ju :-"~ 1 .P !: · · .·l · 11 
J n:.::""-ir··, r'r",,]l 
J u: r icc 1•·· hnq ; i s t · 
Juf'i . .: c.·~ ~,L.:~\'OJG 
Justico O'Cun'1c.r 
From: J ustice Blackmun 
Circulated : hltAR 7 1983 
Rec irculat ed: ________ __ 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting from denial of motion for expe-
dited consideration. 
Baby Girl S was born on January 11, 1981. Her t e enaged mother 
immediately gave h e r up for adoption, and her cu s tody has been in 
dispute ever since. Petitioner, her natural f a ther, hope s to le-
gitirnate the little girl and to obtain cu s tody. Respondent, a 
child plac ement s e rvice, seeks to terminate petitioner's parental 
rights and place Ba by GirlS for adoption. On J a nuary 17, 1983, a 
week after the child's second birthday, this Court granted certio-
rari to consider the constitutionality of a Texas statute that 
denies par e ntal rights to an unmarried father unle ss he can prove 
that legitimation would be in his child's best interests. 
Pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the rules of this Court, petitioner 
has moved for e xpedited consideration of the case. Respondent does 
not oppose the motion. If the case goes over to the next Term, 
then, in accordance with our normal scheduling practices, a deci-
sion will be rendered some time between Nov ember 1983 and July 
1984. Baby Girl S will be nearly three years old by November; by 
the following July, she will be three and a half. Until this case 
is decided, she will have no permane nt horne and will not know who 
her family will be. All parties agree that the child may suffer 
s e rious harm from the continuing unce rtainty a bout who will raise 
,. ~ I'• 
No. 82-647 
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her. If we grant the motion to expedite, a decision will be ren-
dered by July 1983 and Baby Girl S can begin her life with a family 
of her own much sooner. 
Although the briefs will be filed in ample time to permit this 
case to be placed on our April calendar, the Court, inexplicably, 
in my view, has voted to deny the motion to expedite. Yet if the 
grant of certiorari had been only a few weeks earlier, the case 
would have been placed on the April calendar as a matter of course. 
The order in which cases are calendared here, while usually based 
on chronological readiness, always has involved elements of conve-
nience and discretion. A cases may be advanced or postponed in 
light of factors so trivial as the convenience of counsel or the 
availability of a printed appendix. Clearly, the parties in the 
cases we otherwise would hear in April, many of which embrace less 
of the human equation than this one, have no claim to a decision at 
any particular time. I find it hard to believe that the cost in 
human terms of delaying one of those cases until next Fall would 
outweigh the harm to Baby Girl S caused by additional months of 
uncertainty. 
If each case on our April calendar were simply too pressing to 
be postponed, it would be possible, of course, for us to add this 
as an extra case. Surely our workload, while heavy, is not so 
overwhelming or our docket so inflexible that we must acquiesce in 
inflicting possibly unalterable damage to this little girl's life. 
I would grant the motion to expedite. 
CHAI-1BERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.§u.p-rtutt <q:onrt cf tqt ~nitdt .§httts 
~CU'flrittghm. 1fl. <q:. 20c?.lt~ 
March 7, 1983 
Re: No. 82-647 - Kirkpatrick v. Christian Home of Abilene 
" 
Dear Chief: 
If, by chance, this circulation should command five votes, 
I would hope that an order could be issued forthwith rather than 
being delayed until March 21. Of course, if it does not command · 
five votes, perhaps not much is to be lost by the delay. 
Sincerely, 
/fiJ-
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
March 8, 1983 
82-647 ¥irkpatrick v. Christian Home 
Dear Chief: 
I am persuaded by Harry's or.:nn1.on t.o vote to expe-
dite, orovided a place can he madP f.or lt by carrying m1er a 
case now f'lcheduled for April. 
There do seem to be circumstances here that justi-
fy our qranting this motion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 












JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~nprtutt <lfcurlcf flrt 'Jlhtittb ~Wtg 
~a,gfrhtgLm. 18. <!J. 20gt'l.~ 
March 9, 1983 
No. 82-647 Kirkpatrick v. Christian Home 
of Abilene 
Dear Harry: 
: This will confirm that I join in your dissent from denial 
of the motion to expedite in this case. As there now seem to 
be five to grant the motion, I suggest we issue it expeditiously. 
Sincere~y, 
( ' '\ . . 







JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§nvrtmt <!Jomt o-f tfrt ~nib~ .$ihtt.N~ 
~ag!pnghm. 10. <!J. 20~'~--' 
Mr. Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk of the Court 
Dear Al: 
March 9, 1983 
Re: No. 82-647, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
In this case, there is pending a motion to expedite and 
have the case placed on the April calendar. There are now five 
votes to grant that motion. It has been suggested that, rather 
than wait for the order list of March 21, a special order be 
issued so that counsel may be made aware of the disposition of 
the motion. 
May I leave to you the decision as to just how this should 
be accomplished? You may wish to take it up with the Chief 
Justice. 
cc: The Conference 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
;§u:.p-rmu Ofcttrl of flr£~h ~tat£g 
:.as Jri:nghtn. ~. <!}. 20,?~ ~ 
March 10, 1983 
No. 82-647 - Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
There are now five votes to grant expedited hearing in this 
case, and it is suggested we give the parties notice promptly. 
I have not voted to grant expedited consideratio~ but I will not 
be shown on the public record. If any of the non-voters wish to 
be on the public record, please advise the Clerk promptly so that 
he is free to advise counsel in this case as to a date. 
Regards, 
CHAMBE:RS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.;%npum.t <!}o-url of tqt ~n:Utb ~fattg 
1!t1htil4mghm. ~· <!}. 2ll.?'!-~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
April 4, 1983 
Re: No. 82-647, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
This case is scheduled for argument on Tuesday, April 26. 
The questions presented concern the constitutionality of the 
Texas voluntary legitimation statute, Texas Family Code §§13.21-
13.24 ("Subchapter B"). Subchapter B Eermi_ts an unmarried fa-
ther to legitimate his relationship with his biological child 
~ upon a showing that legitimation would be in the child's 
best interests. Petitioner contends that this statute violates 
his rights to due process and equal protection. 
The Attorney General of Texas, who did not participate 
actively in-rhis iitiga t ion below, now has filed a respondent's 
brief making an argument ~hat casts §ome- aou bt on t lie propriety 
oT our grant of certiorar i . Texas cont~as t hat a separate 
portio~-rfe xa s Family Code, §§13. 01-13.09 ("Subchapter 
A"), has "effectively negated the Texas voluntary e itimation 
statute as app e o e 1 1e or Respondent Texas 
8~exas suggests that petitioner may bring a paternity action 
under Subchapter A, and, merely upon a showing of biological 
paternity, may acquire all the rights and duties inuring to 
legitimate par e nts including the right not to have parental 
status terminated absent a showing of unfitness. Texas suggests 
further, perhaps somewhat questionably, that Subchapter A super-
sedes Subchapter B and its "best interests" standard. 
If the Attorney General's interpretation of the statutory 
scheme is correct, Texas law clearly would be within constitu-
tional bounds. This interpretation was not the one applied 
below, however, and it is not inescapable. See, e.g., Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 94 (1982) (describing Subchapter A as 
governing "[t]he rights of illegitimate children to obtain sup-
port from their biological fathers"); Brief for National Commit-
tee for Adoption, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, 4-5, . n. 5; Sampson, 
Determination of Paternity, 13 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 897, 905 
(1982). On prior occasions, we have sent cases back to state 
courts to examine previously unexplored state law issues that 
could affect the exercise of our jurisdiction. E.g., Paschall 
v. Christie - Stewart, 414 U.S. 100 (1973) (vacating and remand-
ing); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (cer-
tifying questions); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (vacating 
and remanding to Supreme Court of Utah); cf. Estelle v. Bullard, 
No. 81-1774 (Jan. 17, 1983) (vacating and remanding to CAS). 
Since Texas has no certification procedure, we could follow a 
Page 2. 
course similar to the one adopted in Paschall, and remand the 
case for a determination whether a putative father may obtain 
full parental rights under Subchapter A upon a showing of bio-
logical fatherhood. 
We should hear from petitioner before takin action, 
but petitioner re r ue until Apr1 19. I 
therefore suggest that the C~erk by teleEhQDe ask petitioner to 
respond within five days to ffie questTon "whether, in light of 
I the representations in the brief filed by the State of Texas, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as imp_£gvidently grant~r the case should be remanaed to the Supreme Court of 
T~for enlightenment as to the Texas law." Unless petitioner 
is able to demonstrate that Subchapter A would not be applicable 
to this case, there may be little reason to hear oral argument 
on the constitutional issue before obtaining clarification from 
the Supreme Court of Texas. At that time we could issue an 
order along these lines: 
"The representations of the State of Texas in its 
brief before this Court bring to light a question of 
state law not passed upon or relied upon below. The 
resolution of this question may establish that peti-
tioner is entitled to the relief he seeks as a matter 
of Texas statutory law. If this is so, a decision of 
the constitutional question on which we granted cer-
tiorari would be unnecessary. See Paschall v. 
Christie-Stewart, 414 U.S. 100 {1973); Musser v. Utah, 
333 u.s. 95 {1948). Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Texas is vacated and the case is 
remanded to that Court for further proceedings to 
determine whether, under Texas law, petitioner could 
have obtained and may still obtain a decree designat-
ing him as the father of his child pursuant to the 
provisions of Texas Family Code §§13.01-13.09" 
As I pointed out in my prior writing when we considered 
petitioner's motion to expedite, there are strong reasons to 
avoid undue delay in this case. The sooner we resolve this 
troublesome problem, the better. 
Of course, you may prefer to defer all this until the oral 







April 4, 1983 
82-647 Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of ~bilene 
Dear Harry: 
~hank you for alerting us to the contents of the 
Texas Attorney General's hrief. 




cc: ~he Conference 
, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.;§u.pumt <!Jottrl of tlrt ~tb .§Wt.s' 
~Jringhttt, ~. <!J. 2!lc?Jl.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 4, 1983 
Re: 82-647 -
Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
Dear Harry, 
I don't object to your suggestion. 
Neither would I mind hearing the case but 
asking petitioner to address the new issue in 
his reply brief and oral argument. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
~uttrtntt <!}cud Llf tqt ~lt ,®hdts 
'llasJringfcn. ~. <!}. 2llpJ!.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 4, 1983 
Re: No. 82-647 - Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes 
of Abilene 
Dear Harry: 






cc: The Conference 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 
April 5, 1983 
Memorandum to the Chief Justice 
Re: Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of 
Abilene, No. 82-647 
In the above case scheduled for argument on 
April 26, 1983, I telephoned counsel for petitioner and 
requested a written response to the following question: 
"whether, in light of the representations 
in the brief filed by the State of Texas, the 
writ of certiorari should be dismissed as 
improvidently granted or the case should be 
remanded to the Supreme Court of Texas for 
enlightenment as to the Texas law." 
Counsel has this date informed me that her typewritten 
response will be in my hands by noon Friday, April 8, 19B3. 
She indicates she will oppose a remand and will ur~e the 
Co~xt to ~roceeG-Wlth Ene sch eduled argument. Basically, 
her posit1on ~that Subchapter A is used in those cases 
where paternity is denied by the man and Subchapter B isused 
in the situation presented by her case. Both sections 
have recently been re-enacted and in her view the statute 
makes no sense unless interpreted as she suggests. To do 
otherwise would render Subchapter B meaningless. Her argu-
ments will be more fully set out in her forthcoming 
memorandum. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk 
.§uprtmt C!Jtntrt cf t~t 1,ltnittb .§tab.s' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
~...-ljington. /!1. ~· 2U;ill~ LJ ~/ 
~~ 
April 8, 1983 ~ 
No. 82-647 Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes 
of Abilene 
Dear Chief, 
Upon reading the petitioner's response, I 
agree we should remove this case from the April 
calendar and issue an order remanding for a 
determination of the question as suggested by 
Harry. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~n;rumt <!Jottrl of tlrt ~tb ~tatts­
~~.~.<!J. 20~~~ 
Re: 82-64 7 -
April 8, 1983 
Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene 
Dear Chief, 
Re your memo of April 8, you hav~ my proxy. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
I ' 
April 11, 19 8 3 
82-647 Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes 
Dear. Chief: 
I agree that we shoul~ hand down Harry's order and 
substitute anothPr case. 
SincerE"1y, 
ThP Chief ~ustic@ 
lfp/ss 





~u:puntt "fcurl of tfrt ~b .:§Wt.s 
Jfa.sJringtcn. ~. <!J. 20,?~~ 
JUSTICE W .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
•• 
April 11, 1983 
Re: No. 82-647 
Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes 
of Abilene 
Dear Chief, 
I agree that we should hand down 
Harry's order. I also think that we 




I , I 
The Chief Justice 
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